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CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATE ANTI-MISCEGENATION
STATUTES
T HE power of a state to prohibit interracial marriage between
its citizens by statute, although not exercised by all states,
has seldom been doubted, even less frequently questioned by
court action, and almost never denied. Indeed, though such statutes
have been in effect in this country since the first one was enacted
by Maryland in 1661, and are presently in effect in 28 other
states, only two decisions have rejected their validity. The first
was rendered by the post-Civil War Supreme Court of Alabama1
and was expressly overruled five years later.2 The second decision,
Perez v. Lippold,3 is very recent and by far the most searching
examination of a state's power to enact this type of legislation.
At common law there were no prohibitions on marriages on
the basis of race or color,4 but prior to passage of the Fourteenth
Amendment the validity of anti-miscegenation statutes was un-
questioned. The police power, under which state legislatures act
to protect the health, safety, morals and general welfare of other
citizens, was deemed sufficient authority for such statutes. Further,
the Negro, at whom they were primarily directed, was in no posi-
tion to challenge them. But when the "guaranty against any en-
croachment upon an acknowledged right of citizenship by the
legislatures of the States"' was afforded him by the Fourteenth
Amendment, attacks were soon made upon these laws. It was,
nevertheless, early established by the state courts that anti-mis-
1 Burns v. State, 48 Ala. 195 (1872).
2 Green v. State, 58 Ala. 190 (1877).
3 32 Cal. 2d 711, 198 P. 2d 17 (1948).
4 55 CJ.S., Marriage, § 15.
Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 124 (1877).
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cegenation laws were not in conflict with the provisions of this
Amendment.' The Supreme Court of the United States strength-
ened this view indirectly by holding valid an Alabama statute
providing more drastic penalties for adultery or fornication where
the parties were mixed Negroes and whites than where both were
either whites or Negroes.7 Although not in issue there, the statute
in question contained a prohibition against marriage between the
two races. Precedent being established, the state courts uniformly
upheld these laws for over half a century until the Supreme Court
of California struck down its own statute in the Perez case. To
date, the exact issue has not been determined by the Supreme
Court of the United States.
In most states the anti-miscegenation statutes take the form of a
prohibition upon the county clerk to issue a license authorizing
the marriage of a white person with a Negro, Indian, mulatto,
Mongolian, Malayan, or other person designated by race or color.
This prohibition is usually accompanied by a declaration that
any such marriage, if performed, is illegal, null and void, and
that the parties thereto are guilty of a felony or misdemeanor.
3
Justification for these statutes was originally placed upon two
grounds:
(1) Public policy, meaning the desire of a majority of the
citizens that the races be kept separate to prevent threats to peace
and good order arising from social tension created by mixed mar-
riages and the resulting ostracism of the persons involved.
(2) Biological and physiological theories that mixture of the
races results in a lowering of the mental and physical attributes
of their offspring, as compared with the children of unmixed
couples of either race.
Peace and good order are usually maintained, however, in the
6 Dodson v. State, 61 Ark. 57, 31 S. W. 977 (1895) ; State v. Gibson, 36 Ind. 389
(1871) ; State v. Jackson, 80 Mo. 175 (1883) ; State v. Hairston, 63 N. C. 451 (1869);
Frasher v. State, 3 Tex. App. 263 (1877).
7 Pace v. Alabama, 106 U.S. 583 (1882).
8 For a detailed index of state laws see Comment, 58 Yale L. J. 472, 480 (1949).
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eighteen states where mixed marriages are now recognized. This
is, of course, no guarantee that order could be maintained in the
states where the statutes are now in effect if they were repealed
because it is in these areas that public sentiment is most strongly
opposed to interracial marriage. With regard to the inferiority of
offspring, it is probably safe to say that the majority of present-
day geneticists deny this theory,9 although many, and especially
the earlier, studies of the subject reached the opposite conclu-
sion.1" There is evidence that resistance to certain diseases and
general intelligence of such children are much higher now than
during the nineteenth century. Obviously, environmental factors
have strong influence upon these characteristics, and the difficulty
to be overcome before tests and surveys on this matter can be
considered conclusive lies in obtaining a sufficiently broad cross-
section of subjects within comparable environments. Formal
schooling, for instance, plays an important part in tests used to
measure general intelligence, and where mulatto children are not
offered educational facilities equal to those furnished white stu-
dents of the same locality, the former are under a definite handi-
cap. At least, it is safe to say that the evidence supporting the
theory of mental inferiority is not as strong today as when the
original decisions regarding these statutes were rendered'
In the Perez case the county clerk of Los Angeles County re-
fused to issue a marriage license to a white woman and a Negro
man because he was forbidden to do so by Section 69 of the
California Civil Code. Section 60 declared any marriage in viola-
tion of the prohibition to be illegal and void. The supreme court
of the state declared the statutes unconstitutional and granted a
writ of mandamus forcing the clerk to issue the license requested.
The case was not appealed within the time allowed, and the clerk
9 KLINEDERC, RACE DIFFERENCES (1935) 182; Linton, The Vanishing American
Negro, 64 Am. Mercury 133, 135 (1947) ; Castle, Biological and Social Consequences
of Race Crossing, 9 Am. J. of Phys. Anthropo!ogy 152 (1926).




was instructed by the county counsel to ignore those sections in
the future.' It is to be regretted that the Supreme Court of the
United States was not called upon to decide the matter and to
settle an issue which is of great interest to the other states having
similar statutes. In a four-to-three decision the majority of the
.California court held Sections 60 and 69 to be a deprivation of
civil liberty contrary to the provisions of the "due process" and
"equal protection" clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. One
justice concurred on the ground that petitioners' religious free-
dom had been abridged in violation of the First Amendment,
which was said to be applicable to the states through the operation
of the Fourteenth Amendment. Three justices dissented, being of
the opinion that the statutes were based upon sound principles
substantially related to the health, safety and morals of the citizens
and that a presumption of their validity should prevail in the
absence of evidence clearly rebutting it. These differing views
give rise to the following considerations.
Due Process and Freedom of Religion. In order to find that
"due process" has been violated, some protected right must be
found to have been restricted. The First Amendment to the Fed-
eral Constitution forbids the Congress from making any laws
"respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof," and it is settled that this prohibition is made
applicable to the legislatures of the various states through the
operation of the Fourteenth Amendment. 2 The freedom of re-
ligion thus secured to all citizens is one of the so-called "funda-
mental" rights, along with others such as freedom of speech,
press and assembly, which may only be abridged if they are being
exercised in such a way as to constitute a "clear and present
danger" to one or more. of the institutions and rights which the
police power is designed to safeguard. This phrase originated in
an opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States written by
31 Note, 34 A. B. A. J. 1129 (1948).
12 Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U. S. 105, 108 (1942).
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Justice Holmes, in which the following test was laid down as to
whether or not a restriction of the right of free speech could be
justified:
"The question in every case is whether the words used are used in
such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and
present danger that they will bring "about the substantive evils that
Congress has a right to prevent." 13
As applied to the issue at hand, the question arises, is marriage
included in the concept of religion and is it therefore a funda-
mental right, as stated in the concurring opinion in the Perez case?
This view is supported by language in a recent decision of the
Supreme Court of the United States concerning a state statute
calling for the sterilization of habitual criminals:
"We are dealing here with legislation which involves one of the basic
civil rights of man. Marriage and procreation are fundamental to the
very existence and survival of the race." 1"
On the other hand, a review of the background and circum-
stances surrounding the passage of the First Amendment in an-
other recent Supreme Court decision indicates that the religious
freedom sought to be guaranteed probably did not include the
freedom to contract a miscegenetic marriage. 5 It is suggested that
the Amendment was intended to protect against certain practices
prevalent in the eighteenth century, such as punishment of per-
sons guilty of speaking disrespectfully of the views of ministers
of government-established churches, of non-attendance at church,
,or of failure to pay taxes and tithes to support the church.
The practice of seeking the sanctions of the church and its
ministers and the use of such terms as "holy matrimony" and
"bonds of holy wedlock" are indicative of the religious connota-
tions of marriage in the minds of most people. The Supreme Court
is Schenck v. U. S., 249 U. S. 47, 52 (1919).
14 Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
15 Everson v. Board of Education of the Township of Ewing, 330 U.S. 1 (1946).
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of Indiana has characterized marriage as a "public institution
established by God himself,"1 and in a leading English case the
following statement is found:17
"Marriage in its origin is a contract of natural law.... In most civil-
ized countries acting under a sense of the force of sacred obligations,
it has had the sanction of religion superadded. It then becomes a
religious as well as a natural and civil contract, for it is a great mistake
to suppose that, because it is one, therefore it may not likewise be the
other."
Nevertheless, the United States Supreme Court has differen-
tiated between religious practice and religious beliefs, holding that
while freedom of the latter is absolute, freedom of the former is
not and may be subject to restriction."8 This theory is illustrated
in a decision of the Court that bigamous marriages could properly
be prohibited, regardless of the religious views of the parties,
without violation of the First Amendment:
"It was never intended or supposed that the Amendment could be in-
voked as a protection against legislation for the punishment of acts
inimical to the peace, good order and morals of society.... However
free the exercise of religion may be, it must be subordinate to the
criminal laws of the country, passed with reference to actions regarded
by general consent as properly the subjects of punitive legislation. ''19
In view of the attitude of our highest court that marriage is
more a practice than a belief, it would seem that the proper view
is that the institution is not to be included in the category of
"fundamental" rights and that a statute restricting marriage need
not be justified by a showing of "clear and present danger." If
this view is accepted, then anti-miscegenation statutes would ap-
pear not to be in conflict with the blanket prohibition contained
in the guarantee of religious freedom in the First Amendment.
Due Process and Marriage as a Personal Liberty. There still
16.State v. Gibson, 36 Ind. 389, 403 (1871).
1? Dalrymple v. Dalrymple, 2 Hagg. Cons. 54, 63, 17 Eng. Rul. Cas. 10, 17 (1811).
18 Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).
19 Davis v. Beason, 133 U. S. 333, 342 (1890).
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remains, however, the admonition of the Fourteenth Amendment
that a state must not deprive its citizens of life, liberty or property
without due process of law. The Supreme Court of the United
States has declared that "liberty" under the due process provision
denotes the right of any individual "to marry, establish a home,
and bring up children...."20 This view places marriage on a mid-
dle ground between the extreme of fundamental rights and mere
contractual rights. Although marriage is often referred to as a
contract, it is actually more a civil relationship, and though the
states may regulate the mode of entering into it, they do not confer
the right to do so. As one of these personal liberties, marriage is
subject to state regulation:
"Marriage, as creating the most important relation in life, as having
more to do with morals and civilization of a people than any other
institution, has always been subject to the control of the legislature."
Under the police power, state restrictions upon the right have
long been upheld when based upon relationship of the parties,
their age, freedom from diseases, mental competency, or suppres-
sion of polygamy. The majority in the Perez case, however, held
that a restriction based on race or color alone, where none of these
other objections is present, is an unreasonable restriction and vio-
lative of due process. The generally accepted requirement as to
what constitutes due process of law was stated in Home Bldg.
& Loan Assn. v. Blaisdell"5 as being simply "whether the legisla-
tion is addressed to a legitimate end and the measures taken are
reasonable and appropriate to that end." This test of reasonable-
ness, as applied to anti-miscegenation statutes, would require find-
ings (1) that mixed marriages constitute a social evil, i.e., a threat
to public health, safety, morals or general welfare, and (2) that
forbidding such marriages is a reasonable means of combatting
20 Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390, 399 (1923).
21 Meister v. Moore, 96 U.S. 76 (1877).
22 Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 205 (1888).
2" 290 U. S. 398, 438 (1934).
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the evil. This test is recognized as a less strict requirement than
that of "clear and present danger" necessary to justify a restric-
tion of a "fundamental" right. From the standpoint of public
policy, it would appear that conditions in certain localities today
might well bring the laws in question within the requirement of
reasonableness stated in the Blaisdell case. The recent Cicero,
Illinois, riots are an indication that the public is not so near to
acceptance of the principle of complete equality of the races as
are the majority of the California court.24 Undoubtedly, uncon-
trolled intermarriage would create a threat to good order in many
states, of which the constitutions of five expressly prohibit such
unions."5
In answer to the minority view that the code provisions were
entitled to a presumption of validity, the California court cited
Korematsu v. U. S., in which the following statement is found:
"It should be noted, to begin with, that all legal restrictions which
curtail the civil rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect.
That is not to say that all such restrictions are unconstitutional. It is to
say that courts must subject them to the most rigid scrutiny. Pressing
public necessity may sometimes justify the existence of such restic-
tions; racial antagonism never can."12 6
It is submitted that "public necessity" in some localities may be
entirely different from what it is in others, and it would seem
wise to entrust the legislatures of the various states with the task
of interpreting the sentiments of the populace and of harmonizing
the laws with their particular ways of life.
Equal Protection of the Laws. Section 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment also provides that no state shall deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. "The equal
protection of the laws is a pledge of the protection of equal
24 Cicero Nightmare, The Nation, July 28, 1951, p. 64; Defeat in Chicago, 68 The
Christian Century 862 (July 25, 1951) ; New Disgrace for Cicero, Life, July 23, 1951,
p. 22.
25 Alabama, Florida, North and South Carolina and Tennessee.
26 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
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laws."2 In support of the argument that anti-miscegenation laws
do not violate this principle of the Constitution, it has been said
that since the law and punishment for its violation apply equally
to both parties, and each is free to marry within his own race,
there is no arbitrary discrimination.2" This position would seem
untenable, however, in view of the pronouncement of the Supreme
Court of the United States that individual rights, not those of
races, are the object of the protective measures in the Fourteenth
Amendment. 29 Not all classifications of its citizens by the legisla-
ture of a state are unconstitutional, however, as revealed in the
following quotation:
"It is unnecessary to say that the 'equal protection of the laws'
required by the Fourteenth Amendment does not prevent the States
from resorting to classification for the purposes of legislation... . But
the classification must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon
some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the
object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced
shall be treated alike. 80
Of course, it is not enough that the statute being tested meets
these requirements on its face if it is not administered fairly and
justly by the officers whose duty it is to apply the law."1 The courts
will examine the practical effects of these statutes to determine
if unjust and illegal discriminations are being made. No valid
claim can be made that equal justice is being observed when it is
realized that the State of California recognizes interracial mar-
riages of the very type forbidden by its statute so long as they
are performed in another state. This is true whether the persons
were citizens of another state at the time the marriage was per-
formed and subsequently moved to California, or whether Cali-
fornia citizens of different races travel to another state or to
2 7 Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886).
25 Cases cited supra note 6.
29 Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
30 Royster Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U. S. 412, 415 (1920).
81 Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886).
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Mexico for a so-called "carfare" marriage and return and live
together.
Conclusion. It is evident that the Supreme Court of the United
States is striving zealously to protect the rights and liberties of
racial minorities, and any arbitrary denial of these rights and
liberties by a state, based solely upon race or color, is subjected
to rigid examination in the light of the due process and equal pro-
tection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. The ends sought
must be legitimate, and the means adopted must have a reasonable
relation to those ends. Comparatively, a restriction upon the
scope of a person's choice of his marriage partner seems equally
as much a deprivation of liberty and denial of equal protection
as restrictions against owning property, living in a certain neigh-
borhood, going to certain schools, following one's chosen profes-
sion, voting, or serving on juries, all of which have been declared
unconstitutional when based upon race or color alone."2 It is also
probable that more courts will be inclined, when passing on the
validity of anti-miscegenation statutes, to give less weight to the
presumption of their constitutionality, since the decisions upon
which this presumption are based were founded to some extent
upon race prejudice and inconclusive data. Inasmuch as the ex-
press purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment was to prevent state
legislation designed to perpetrate discrimination on the basis of
race or color, the opposite presumption should prevail, and it
would appear that the validity of anti-miscegenation statutes is in
serious question.
Wayne A. Melton.*
82 Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U. S. 629 (1950) ; Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U. S. 1 (1948) ;
Oyama v. California, 332 U. S. 633 (1948) ; U. S. v. Classic, 313 U. S. 299 (1941) ; Meyer
v. Nebraska, 262 U. S. 390 (1923) ; Strander v. West Virginia, 100 U. S. 303 (1879).
*Third-year student, Southern Methodist University School of Law.
